TIME: Almanac 1990/1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso/time/040389/04038900.041

Text File | 1990-09-22 | 10KB | 166 lines

NATION, Page 18

The Diaspora's Discontent

U.S. Jews are leaning on Shamir to bend his rigid policies

By Laurence I. Barrett


    As darkness fell over Jerusalem's Old City last Wednesday,
Orthodox Jews recited evening prayers at the Western Wall, the
remains of King Herod's great temple and the symbol of the fall of
Israel two millenniums ago. Armed border police stood guard against
terrorists while 1,500 leaders of the Diaspora, more than half of
them Americans, assembled for a "Conference on Jewish Solidarity
with Israel." Mordechai Gur, commander of the troops that wrested
the Old City from Jordan in 1967, read a closing proclamation: "We
support the democratically elected government of national unity in
its efforts to achieve peace and security with its neighbors."

    The gathering, declared Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, was "a
great success" that "demonstrated total support of all Jewish
people for the State of Israel."  But the fact that he found it
necessary to convene such an international pep rally before his
first meeting next week with President Bush underscored Shamir's
well-founded worries about his standing abroad, notably in the U.S.
Shamir's convocation could not disguise the growing impatience of
many Jews outside Israel. They bridle at his stubborn resistance
to any accommodation with the rebellious Palestinians living in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza. Nor could the event paper over
his fear of the increasingly assertive attempts to force him to
adopt a more flexible stance. That activism strengthens
Washington's effort to prod Israel into direct talks with the
Palestine Liberation Organization.

    Traditionally, the politically potent American Jewish community
has been a buffer against U.S. Government pressure on Israel.
Though their support for Israel, as the embodiment of the Jewish
people, remains as solid as the stone blocks in the Western Wall,
many American Jews balked at being used as extras in Shamir's
biblical unity epic. Some of those invited journeyed to Jerusalem
with misgivings; others stayed home. The open criticism from
American Jews is raising fears in Jerusalem, which depends on the
U.S. for military and economic survival. Says Yossi Ahimeir,
director of the Prime Minister's bureau: "When the U.S.
Administration sees that support of American Jews for Israel is
diminishing, it can allow itself to take more critical positions."

    Divisions among Israelis compound Shamir's difficulties. At
the start of the three-day meeting in Jerusalem, stories in Israeli
newspapers described a new intelligence analysis contending that
the intifadeh -- the popular uprising by Palestinians in Gaza and
the West Bank -- could not be suppressed by force. Only political
measures, including talks with the P.L.O., would lead to a
solution.

    Shamir initially denounced the stories as "lies," but later
his spokesman acknowledged that the intelligence report existed.
While the document offered no specific recommendations, it did say
Jerusalem could no longer ignore the P.L.O. The intelligence
assessment came a fortnight after a critical report from the
prestigious Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv
University. In a study sponsored by the American Jewish Congress,
the think tank concluded that none of the long-term peace options
that either Shamir or the Palestinian leadership considers
acceptable have any chance to succeed. The scholars argued that
moving beyond the status quo requires a long process of mutual
accommodation starting with direct talks with the P.L.O. and
possibly ending with creation of a circumscribed Palestinian state.

    Such domestic pressure reinforces the Bush Administration's
strategy: declining to put forth a made-in-Washington peace plan
that Shamir would immediately reject, while allowing mounting
diplomatic heat to force him to come up with his own proposal. The
White House has made clear that it expects the Israeli leader to
bring along some ideas when he sees Bush on April 6. At the same
time, the Administration suggests modest concessions by both sides
as first steps toward an eventual agreement. On Israel's part, such
"confidence-building measures" would include releasing at least
some Palestinians imprisoned during the intifadeh and holding
elections leading to a limited form of autonomy for Gaza and the
West Bank. The U.S. is also urging Jerusalem to start talking to
Palestinian leaders who live in the occupied territories but do not
belong to the P.L.O. Much to Shamir's displeasure, Secretary of
State James Baker declared last week that it would be a "major
mistake" to rule out direct Israeli-P.L.O. negotiations in the
likely event that no Palestinian leader would sit down with the
Israelis without the approval of the P.L.O.

    Though P.L.O. chief Yasser Arafat has become more flexible and
wily in his diplomacy, his organization's intransigence nearly
matches Shamir's. In his first formal session with the P.L.O. last
week, a four-hour meeting in Carthage, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
Robert Pelletreau failed to persuade Arafat's representatives to
order a halt to the rock throwing and other violence of the
intifadeh. The rebuff, together with continued raids from Lebanese
territory, showed that progress toward a settlement is more than
a matter of moving Shamir's government.

    Still, Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to exist --
expressed in language acceptable to Washington if not to Jerusalem
-- has altered the political dynamics. The fact that five prominent
American Jews coaxed Arafat until he finally got his rhetoric right
in December demonstrated the changing role of American Jewry. When
one of the quintet, Menachem Rosensaft, returned from the Stockholm
meeting with Arafat, an effort was made to oust him as head of the
Labor Zionist Alliance and member of the Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations. He survived the attempted
purge, and remains a vehement critic of Likud policy. "I am
particularly troubled," he says, "by the arrogant position that
they do not have to come forward with anything constructive."

    Most of the leaders of mainstream Jewish organizations are more
circumspect in their public utterances, but they have been
bombarding Jerusalem with private warnings that Shamir is losing
support in the U.S. Both the Conference of Presidents and the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee ignored Jerusalem's cue
to protest Washington's decision to deal with the P.L.O. Moreover,
there has been a growing inclination by Jewish leaders to display
what has been quietly obvious for years: a preference for the
Israeli Labor Party's more flexible approach. Theodore Mann, former
head of the American Jewish Congress, argues that Jewish activists
should "try to make a difference. Through some process there should
be an exchange of land for peace with security."

    A poll sponsored by the American Jewish Committee shows similar
feelings among rank-and-file American Jews. The survey found that
58% of American Jews endorse and 18% oppose Israeli-P.L.O.
negotiations, provided Arafat's recognition of Israel and
renunciation of terrorism are genuine. The poll found that, by a
lesser margin, they favor Labor over Likud.

    The strongest consensus in the poll was opposition by 86% to
a change in Israeli law "so as to recognize only those conversions
performed by Orthodox rabbis." When last fall's election gave
neither Likud nor Labor a clear majority, each considered forming
a coalition with ultra-Orthodox religious parties. The price would
have been high: giving the fanatic religious groups exclusive power
over the religious conversion of immigrants to Israel. By
implication, the legitimacy of Conservative and Reform Jews would
have been undermined. Outraged protests from abroad helped torpedo
that idea and forced creation of another inaptly named "unity"
government joining Likud and Labor. It also made it easier for
Diaspora Jews to vent their unease over other issues. Says
Alexander Schindler, head of the U.S. Reform movement: "The
`who-is-a-Jew' issue gave license for many to express their
cumulative distress."

    Still, that distress has limits. Neither Schindler nor many
other prominent leaders are ready to write off Shamir as hopeless.
There is also understandable skepticism about the genuineness of
Arafat's conversion to moderation. Despite the anguish over
Israel's harsh response to the intifadeh, donations to the United
Jewish Appeal and the purchase of Israel bonds continue to grow.

    Ten years ago last week, another adamant Likud leader, Menachem
Begin, signed a peace treaty with Egypt and embraced his foe, Anwar
Sadat. At a meeting of Israel-bond volunteers in Washington
commemorating that breakthrough, Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel
movingly evoked the dilemma felt by many Jews. Wiesel, a survivor
of the Holocaust, warned against allowing frustration over the
absence of peace to be translated into disunity. "I feel so much
gratitude to the people of Israel and to the State of Israel," he
said, "that I simply cannot bring myself to become a judge over my
people."

    That is the emotional chain that has bound America's 6 million
Jews to Israel's 3.6 million. Together with their fears of Arab
animosity, the connection has maintained Jewish solidarity for
decades. But the nature of that unity is being redefined. With many
Israelis openly yearning for a change in direction, American Jews
now feel free to help them bring it about.